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Abstract: 
A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme is introduced. The 
attack exploits a parasitic/periodic AC voltage-source at either Alice’s or Bob’s end. Such situations exist due to 
AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the 
generalized form of the former DC ground loop based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power spectrum of 
the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense 
protocols against the attack are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Security is one of the most important features of modern communication systems. Standard 
security schemes in most of today's computer and communication systems utilize algorithms 
that require computationally hard tasks for the eavesdropper (Eve) to extract the key. Therefore 
these schemes are so-called conditionally secure systems because they are temporarily secure 
under the assumption that Eve has insufficient computational power to crack the secure data 
[1].  
 Another class of data security is unconditional or information theoretic (IT) security [2,3]. 
These systems stay secure regardless of the amount of computational and hardware resources 
Eve uses in her attack [2-4].  
 An essential component of these secure protocols is the secure key distribution (exchange) 
that provides the private encryptions keys for the ciphers of the communicating parties. To 
achieve unconditional security for the communications, the exchanged keys must also be IT 
secure. Existing IT secure key distribution methods over the communication channel utilize the 
laws of physics to provide security. For two classes of IT secure key exchange exist: 
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i) Quantum key distribution (QKD): This class utilizes the quantum physical laws of photonics, 
such as the non-cloning theorem, to provide security [5]. Note, both its theoretical and practical 
security have been challenged even though the practical cracks have been fixed with proper 
patches [6-41].  
ii) The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution: Its security is based on 
the laws of classical statistical physics, specifically the fluctuation-dissipation theorem, to 
generate/share the secure keys [4,42-58].  
 
1.1 The KLJN key exchange system 
 
The Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme is a key-exchange method that uses 
classical statistical physics and electronics to provide unconditional security [4,42-58]. Even 
an eavesdropper of unlimited computing power, or unlimited measured speed and accuracy is 
unable to crack this key protocol. The KLJN scheme is superior to QKD in the following 
respects: It can be integrated onto a chip; it is less expensive; vibration and dust resistant; 
maintenance-free; and it consume less power [42]. 
 
 The core of the KLJN system is shown in Figure 1. The information channel is a wire 
between the two communication parties, “Alice” and “Bob.” In each bit exchange period, that 
is, clock cycle, both parties randomly select and connect a resistor from an identical pair, LR  
and HR  ( LR > HR ), respectively. Thus four connected resistor combinations exist: LL, HH, 
LH, and HL, where the first letter stands for Alice’s chosen resistance and the second letter for 
Bob’s one. The power-density spectra of the voltage and the current in the channel (wire) is 
given by the Johnson formula [4,42]: 
 
 
Su,w ( f ) = 4kTeff
RA RB
RA + RB
 ,        (1) 
 
 
Si,w||( f ) =
4kTeff
RA + RB
 ,         (2) 
 
where k  is Boltzmann’s constant, Teff is the (effective) noise temperature, and AR  and BR  (
A B L H& { , }R R R R∈ ) are the chosen/connected resistances by Alice and Bob, respectively. 
 
 Alice and Bob measure the current I(t) and/or the voltage U(t) in the wire and use 
equations (1) and (2) to find the value of the connected resistance at the other end. The 
eavesdropper—Eve—can also measure the channel current and voltage and can deduce the 
values of the connected resistances by solving equations (1) and (2) for the two variables AR  
and  RB . However, under ideal conditions [44], she cannot identify the locations of the 
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resistances, unless  RA = RB  [42]. In other words, in the case of  RA ≠ RB  Eve's information 
entropy is 1 bit about the exchanged bit value, that is, the security is perfect [2,6]. Hence, we 
can call the LH and HL situations (where the resistances are different) secure situations that 
are occurring at 50% of the time. Alice and Bob publicly agree about the key bit value 
interpretation of the LH and HL situations, for example, LH implies bit value 0 and HL 
corresponds to bit value 1. They discard the data of the non-secure situations.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The core of a KLJN secure bit exchange system. The quantities LAn ( )U t , HAn ( )U t , LBn ( )U t , and HBn ( )U t   
are the (thermal) noise voltage generators for the related resistances, and ( )U t  and ( )I t  represent the measured 
noise voltage and current in the wire, respectively. At practical applications the thermal noises are emulated by 
external generator circuitries [50] with high  Teff  noise temperature to enhance security and resilience [45]. 
 
 The KLJN scheme can also be operated by using active external noise generators [50] 
mimicking thermal noise at publicly agreed very high temperature Teff (such as 1015 K).  The 
power spectral densities of the noise generators can be expressed as u,n,m ( )S f VR=  , where the 
indices represent the chosen resistor value, { , }n L H∈  ,and the location (Alice or Bob), 
{ , }m A B∈  , and  V = kTeff  is a publicly agreed common temperature coefficient. 
 
 To improve the security of the original scheme, different enhanced versions of the KLJN 
were introduced [4,44-49]. A variety of potential applications have been proposed for the KLJN 
system [59-72]. 
 
 Several potential security vulnerabilities of the KLJN system have been addressed in 
previous research [4,42,73-86]. However, in each case it was shown that these attacks do not 
compromise the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme because, similarly to quantum 
encryption, the information leak can be eliminated by defense hardware and privacy 
amplification. The attacks can be classified into three main categories: active attacks 
[4,42,46,73,74,88]; passive attacks (utilizing non-ideal conditions)  [43,75-87]; and flawed 
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attack attempts [87-93] that were also useful for a deeper understanding of the security 
features and robustness of the method. 
 
 
1.2 DC loop current attacks 
 
In an ideal KLJN system no DC current is present. However, if there is, that serves with 
potential information leak toward Eve. Papers [75,76] explored passive attack schemes that 
exploit the existence of parasitic DC sources, which is typical in digital circuitry through non-
zero ground resistance (ground loop effects). In [75] the parasitic DC source is located at one 
end of the information channel while in [76] DC sources are located at both ends. It was 
shown that non-zero information leak exists which can be eliminated by various methods, 
such as filtering, compensation, increased temperature, privacy amplification, etc. [75,76].  
 
 In a subsequent work [78], additional security risks of these DC sources were studied 
under two active attacks: the man-in-the-middle attack and the current-injection-attack. The 
conclusion of these analyses is that parasitic DC sources do not increase the feasibility and 
information leak related to these active attacks.  
 
 As a significant enhancement of DC loop voltage and current attacks, in this paper we 
explore the situation of periodic AC voltage sources in the loop. This situation is very general 
at long-range secure communications thus it must be taken very seriously. We show that the 
new attack requires different procedures in the high and low frequency limits. 
 
 
2. The AC Ground Loop Current Situation 
 
In the next sections, the security of the KLJN is studied when a single periodic AC source 
AAC ( )U t  is located at one of the communicating parties, see Figure. 2, where AAC ( )U t  is a 
periodic AC time function. Such situations exist due to AC ground loop and/or electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) from motors, power supplies, wireless networks, etc. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the AC source is present only at Alice’s terminal.  
 
The voltage on the wire (see Figure 2) can be given as:  
 
B AAC A Bn B An
AC n
A B A B
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) R U t R U t R U tU t U t U t
R R R R
+≡ + = +
+ +
   (3) 
 
where An LAn HAn{ ; }U U U∈  and Bn LBn HBn{ ; }U U U∈  are the standard voltage noise sources of the 
chosen resistors, AR  and BR , and AC ( )U t  and n ( )U t  are the periodic (parasitic) and the 
fundamental noise (stochastic) voltages components on the wire, respectively.  
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Fig. 2. The KLJN system compromised by a single periodic AC source at Alice’s side. U(t) and I(t) are the voltage 
and current on/in the wire, respectively. AAC( )U t  is the AC ground loop voltage source. A B L H& { ; }R R R R∈  are 
the randomly chosen resistances by Alice and Bob, respectively. An LAn HAn{ ; }U U U∈  and Bn LBn HBn{ ; }U U U∈  are 
the voltage noise sources affiliated with A B&R R , respectively. AC ( )U t  is the periodic voltage component on the 
wire and AC ( )I t  is the periodic current component in the wire. n ( )U t  and n ( )I t  are the fundamental noise voltage 
and current components in the wire, respectively. 
 
The periodic component can be written as (see Figure 2): 
 
B AAC
AC
A B
( )( ) R U tU t
R R
=
+
 ,     (4) 
see Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the AC component of the voltage on the wire AC ( )U t  in the (a) LH situation (b) HL situation 
(c) LL situation and (d) HH situation when L 1 kR = Ω  and H 10 kΩR =  , see Equation 4. 
 
The noise component of the voltage on the wire, as given earlier [4,45,75]: 
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 A Bn B An
n
A B
( ) ( )( ) R U t R U tU t
R R
+=
+
           (5) 
 
In the next section we introduce the new attack schemes. 
 
 
3. The AC loop current attacks 
 
The attack protocol depends on the  fA / fC  ratio where Af  is the frequency of the periodic 
source and  fC  is the frequency of the bit exchange. Below we describe two protocols for 
different frequency limits. 
 
 
3.1 Attack in the low-frequency limit  
 
 If the frequency of the periodic source Af  is less than the bit exchange (clock) frequency C,f  
Eve can attack the secure bit exchange if she knows the time function  UAAC(t)  of the periodic 
source. The attack has the same basic steps as the DC attack procedure described in [75,76]: 
 
(i) Measurement: Eve measures and records N independent samples of the voltage U(t) on the 
wire during the bit exchange period, where the sampling rate is determined by the Nyquist 
sampling theorem and it is double of the noise bandwidth.  
 
(ii) Evaluation:  Eve calculates a quantity  γ i  defined as: 
 
          
 
γ i =
Ni
+
N
 ,      (6) 
   
 
where  Ni
+  is the number of samples that are above a threshold voltage  
U th,i  which is fixed 
during the i-th bit exchange period. The new aspect of the low-frequency AC attacks compared 
to the DC attacks [75,76] is that here the threshold Uth,i varies between bit exchange periods. 
The actual threshold  
U th,i  is the time average of the periodic component over the i-th bit 
exchange period: 
 
 
 
U th,i =
1
τ
UAAC(t)dt
ti-1
ti
∫  ,          (7)
    
where it  is the end of the i-th bit exchange period, and  τ = ti − ti-1  is the duration of the bit 
exchange periods. Note, in this new situation, the threshold is not always positive.  
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(iii) Guessing:  
 
Eve's guess of the secure resistor situation is: 
 
 - LH when 
 
U th,i > 0 and γ i > 0.5{ } ; or  U th,i < 0 and γ i < 0.5{ }  ,            (8) 
 - HL when 
 
U th,i > 0 and γ i < 0.5{ } ; or  U th,i < 0 and γ i > 0.5{ } .      (9) 
 
Furthermore: 
 
 If  
U th,i = 0 , the bit will be discarded  (as undetermined).                                                (10) 
 For  γ i = 0.5  , the bit will be discarded (as undetermined).               (11) 
 
 
3.2 Attack in the high-frequency limit  
 
In the high frequency limit, the previous attack procedure does not work. Our proposed attack 
is executed in the spectral domain. We assume Eve knows the frequency of the periodic source.  
The attack protocol in the high frequency limit consists of three phases: 
 
(i) Preparation phase: As preparation for the attack, Eve is running computer simulations of the 
KLJN system. She can do that because in accordance with the Kerckhoffs's principle [4,6] of 
unconditional security Eve supposedly knows all the details of protocol and hardware except 
the actual secure key. 
 
(a) From the computer simulations she obtains the simulated voltages on the wire, specifically, 
the total voltage  Us (t) , its noise component  Uns (t)  and its AC component  UACs(t) . Then, from 
these time functions she calculates the squared absolute values of their Fourier transforms over 
each bit exchange periods:  |Us ( f ) |
2   | Ns ( f ) |
2  and  | ACs ( f ) |
2 , respectively. From these 
spectra, she calculates:  
 
(b) The "simulated noise-background", 
 
| Ns ( f ) |
2
M
 , which is the ensemble average of 
simulated  | Ns ( f ) |
2  spectra over a large number, M, of LH and HL bit exchange periods. (Note, 
in accordance with the KLJN protocol (see Section 1.1) using only LH or only HL periods 
would result in the same values provided the KLJN system is ideal). 
 
(c) The "AC threshold ”, 
 
| ACth ( f ) |
2
W
, that is defined as:  
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| ACth ( f ) |
2
W
=
| ACs,LH ( f ) |
2
W
+ | ACs,HL( f ) |
2
W
2
     (12) 
 
where 
 
| ACs,LH ( f ) |
2
W
 and 
 
| ACs,HL( f ) |
2
W
 are spectral averages over the frequency: they are 
the average of the  | ACs ( f ) |
2  function over the noise bandwidth W , in the LH and HL 
situations, respectively. Note, the LH and HL cases are different for the AC component due to 
the voltage division factor of the different resistance values (RL vs RH) at the two parties. 
 
(ii) Measurement phase: At the i-th bit exchange period, Eve measures the voltage Ui(t) on the 
wire and determines the actual  |U i ( f ) |
2  . Then, she subtracts the simulated noise background 
 
| Ns ( f ) |
2
M
 from  |U i ( f ) |
2  to estimate the actual  | ACi ( f ) |
2  , and computes its spectral 
average : 
     
   
 
| ACi ( f ) |
2
W
= |U i ( f ) |
2 − | Ns ( f ) |
2
M W
 ,      (13) 
 
which is scaling with the mean-square of the AC voltage component on the wire during the i-th bit 
exchange period. 
 
(iii) Guessing phase: Eve compares 
 
| ACi ( f ) |
2
W
 with the AC threshold 
 
| ACth ( f ) |
2
W
 . 
Based on this comparison, she guesses the actual secure resistor situation as: 
 
-LH when 
 
| ACi ( f ) |
2
W
 >  | ACth ( f ) |
2         (14) 
 
-HL when 
 
| AC( f ) |2
W
 <  | ACth ( f ) |
2  .       (15) 
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Fig.4. The square absolute value of the Fourier transform of simulated voltage components: (a) that of the voltage 
on the wire: |Us ( f ) |
2 ; (b) that of the AC component:  | ACs ( f ) |
2 ; (c) that of the noise voltage component 
 | Ns ( f ) |
2 ; (d) that of the estimated AC component 
 
|U i ( f ) |
2 − | Ns ( f ) |
2
M
. The simulation was conducted with 
sinusoidal periodic source of frequency Af =1kHz, and the clock (bit exchange) frequency Cf =500 Hz. The noise 
bandwidth Bf =100kHz, the effective noise temperature is 
159x10 K, while  RL  and  RH  are 1 kΩ  and 10 kΩ , 
respectively. 
 
 
4. Demonstration of the Attacks 
 
To evaluate the success of the attacks, we ran simulations in both the low and high frequency 
limits. The probability p of Eve's correct bit value guessing [4,6] is: 
 
tot
cor
tot
lim  
n
np
n→∞
= 	 (16)	
 
where corn  is the number of the successfully guesses, and totn  is the total number of guesses. 
When 0.5p = , the key exchange scheme is perfectly secure [2-4,6]. 
 
During the simulations, LR , HR , Cf , and Bf  were 1 kΩ , 10 kΩ , 1 kHz  and 100 kHz, 
respectively. The length of the key was 1000 bits. We chose  UAAC(t) = cos(2π fAt) [Volt]  
where the frequency fA of the periodic component was varied.  
 
The noise generation is described below. 
 
 
4.1 Generating the Johnson noise 
 
MATLAB was used to generate the Gaussian Band-Limited White Noise (GBWN). Significant 
efforts were made to improve Gaussianity, reduce bias, and avoid any aliasing error which are 
typical weaknesses in computer simulations. At first, using the MATLAB randn() function, 242  
or 16,777,216 Gaussian random numbers were generated. Next the noise was converted from 
the time domain to the frequency domain using the MATLAB FFT function, and, to get rid of 
any aliasing error, we increased the sampled bandwidth by zero padding. The real component 
of the inverse FFT  resulted in a GBWN noise with Nyquist sampling rate and reduced aliasing 
errors. The final step was to scale the noise amplitude to the physical effective value by the 
Johnson formula (see Equation 1) at known resistance, temperature and bandwidth.  
 
More details about the noise generator will be available in [94]. 
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4.2 Demonstration of the attack in the low-frequency Limit  
 
Tests utilizing Equations 6-11 and computer simulations were conducted at different periodic 
frequencies in the low-frequency limit, 1 kHz = fC >> fA  =318.3, 101.32 and 32.25 Hz, with 
 UAAC(t) = cos(2π fAt) [Volt] , see Figure 4. By varying the noise temperature Teff (see Equation 
1) the effective noise voltage Ueff on the wire  (see Equation 1) ranged from 0.01 to 100 Vrms. 
Figure 4 shows the probability p of correct guessing of the bit versus the effective value  Ueff  
the KLJN noise voltage on the wire. Similarly to the DC loop current attacks in [75,76], at low 
Ueff values compared to the amplitude of the periodic component, the system is highly 
vulnerable (p=1) while at high effU  values the system is perfectly secure ( p=0.5 ).  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The correct guessing probability p vs the effective noise voltage Ueff on the wire. The noise bandwidth Bf  
is 100 kHz, the clock (bit exchange) frequency Cf  is 1 kHz, the key length is 1000, and the frequency of the 
sinusoidal source Af  is 318.30, 101.32 and 32.25 Hz and its amplitude is  UAAC(t) = cos(2π fAt) [Volt] . 
 
 
4.3 Demonstration of the attack in the high-frequency limit 
 
For the given periodic AC signal, the Fourier transform was obtained using fast the Fourier 
transform (FFT) protocol. The tests were conducted under the same conditions as in Section 
4.2, except the periodic frequency Af  was set  to 2, 16, and 32 kHz, and the bit exchange 
(clock) frequency Cf  was set to 500Hz. Figure 5 shows Eve’s correct-guessing probability p  
with respect to the KLJN noise voltage Ueff on the wire (controlled by the varying noise 
temperature Teff, see Equation 1) . Similarly to the DC loop current attacks in [75, 76], at low 
Ueff values compared to the amplitude of the periodic component, the system is highly 
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vulnerable (p=1) while at high effU  values the system is perfectly secure ( p=0.5 ). The change 
from vulnerability to security takes place at a higher effU  values for higher fA frequencies. 
 
 Fig. 6. The probability p of correct guessing vs the effective noise voltage Ueff on the wire. The noise bandwidth 
Bf  is 100 kHz, the clock frequency Cf  is 500 Hz, the key length is 1000, and the frequency of the periodic 
sinusoidal source Af  is 2, 16, and 32 kHz. 
 
 
5. Defense against theattacks 
 
The attack can be defended using the similar defense techniques mentioned in [75, 76]: 
i) Elimination of the parasitic sources. 
 
ii) Filtering out the parasitic component. 
 
iii) Increasing the effective voltage of the noise on the wire (that is increasing the noise 
temperature Teff) to approach the limit of perfect security.  
 
iv) Various privacy amplification protocols on the exchanged secure bits [4,6,44,52,74,86,88]. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper introduced a novel attack against the KLJN secure key exchange. The attack 
addressed the situation when there is a single parasitic AC source at side of Alice. Such 
situation could exist due to AC ground loops, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) from 
power motors, power supplies, wireless networks; etc.  
 
At low-frequency disturbance, the attack follows a generalized procedure of the earlier DC 
attack in [75].  
At high-frequency disturbance, the attack is based on frequency analysis, separating the 
periodic component and the utilizing the same threshold crossing statistics as in [75,76]. 
 
The vulnerability of the KLJN scheme against these attacks was successfully demonstrated by 
computer simulations. An important implication is that, when the KLJN system is working in 
the "stealth" mode, where the natural thermal noise voltages of the resistors are used and the 
periodic component cannot be over-powered by artificial noise generators at the resistors, a 
strong effort must be made to eliminate any periodic component from the loop otherwise 
significant information leak can be present during these attacks. 
 
Finally we listed available defense methods against these attacks. A practical KLJN secure key 
exchanger must also be armed against these new types of attacks, too. 
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